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Rhetorical Ethics and the Language
of Virtue: Problems of Agency
and Action
Erica Frisicaro-Pawlowski

inks between ethical education and rhetorical education run deep, and
discussions of ethical pedagogy have been both common and crucial to
rhetoric and composition’s development since the field’s inception. This
association between ethics and rhetorical education is deeply embedded
within the ethos of the field, given the classical emphasis on rhetoric as the exercise of good citizenship and the central role writing plays in general education
curricula. Historically poised at the portal to higher education, composition
courses have played an outsized role in the formation of good academic citizens.
In particular, as observed by Lynn Bloom two decades ago, first-year composition
serves as a mechanism to inculcate in students “the middle-class values that are
thought to be essential to the proper functioning of students in the academy”
(656), among them responsibility (658–9), respectability (659–60), propriety
(660–1), and order (663–4). If, as Barbara Grant argues, our professional ethics
call upon us to reflect on “what kind of people we want our students to become
and how our practices are contributing to this formation” (101), composition
studies has much to answer for.
This motivation to explore the ethical implications of our practice has become, according to Anne Wysocki, “[t]he murmuring background soundtrack to
all our work” (282). Within our recent playlist, however, John Duffy has emerged
as perhaps the most prominent theorist of the ethical current in composition. In
two recent articles—“Ethical Dispositions: A Discourse for Rhetoric and Composition” (“Ethical”) and “The Good Writer: Virtue Ethics and the Teaching
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of Writing” (“Writer”)—Duffy illuminates extensive historical and pedagogical
linkages between rhetoric and ethics, making the case for writing as the practice
of virtue (“Writer” 231). In the former, Duffy argues that “to teach writing is by
definition to teach ethics; more specifically it is to teach what I will call ‘ethical
dispositions,’ or the communicative practices of honesty, accountability, compassion, intellectual courage, and others” (“Ethical” 213). In his more recent
piece, Duffy expands his model of ethical dispositions by situating them in the
Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics and recasting them as “rhetorical virtues,”
or “the discursive practices of virtue, the expression in speech and writing of
honesty, accountability, generosity, and other qualities” (“Writer” 235). According to Duffy, such virtues are inherently linked to actions through speech, as
“the rhetorical virtues reflect the traits, attitudes, and dispositions we associate
with a good person, speaking or writing well” (“Writer” 235). Surely, a mark of
good writing instruction is to develop writers capable of honesty, accountability,
generosity, and the like, yet the parallels between Bloom’s “middle-class values”
and Duffy’s vision of “rhetorical virtues”—between honesty and propriety, accountability and responsibility, generosity and respectability, and so forth—are
cause for reflection.
Duffy’s work illustrates a common thread in scholarship exploring the
intersections between rhetorical and ethical theories in that it grounds the aims
of writing instruction in the rhetorical tradition, connecting our disciplinary
aspirations with those of rhetorical history and positioning composition firmly
within the conventions of liberal education. Ethics thus becomes closely aligned
with pedagogies designed to foster learning in service to the common good.
So, for example, Duffy and scholars like Kathleen Welch highlight classically
rooted connections between rhetoric and ethical education by referencing shared
values communicated through writing practices: “to make difficult material understandable to a wide range of decoders,” according to Welch (144); and “to
demonstrate integrity by delivering the testimonies, documents, or other forms
of proof through which one’s claims may be measured, tested, and evaluated,”
according to Duffy (“Ethical” 220). In this way, relationships between ethics
and the rhetorical tradition become integral to our institutional roles and cast
in terms that complement current classroom practices.
Yet in “Teaching Rhetorical Values and the Question of Student Autonomy,” Dennis Lynch cautions us to consider the ends served by appeals to
tradition, calling attention to the circularity of arguments commonly used in
discussions of such values:
If a rhetorical education serves in the process of constructing good citizens, then
it can do so only because it reflects the values implied in the very idea of “good
citizenship” (contested as they may be). The shape of rhetoric—in other words,
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its subtle directives and unquestioned norms—adapts to its function at any given
historical juncture, and its destiny is tied to the reproduction of attitudes and values
that in turn protect and make possible the activity itself. (353–54; emphasis added)

The field has proudly placed the construction of good citizens—good writers,
good students, good subjects—at its ethical center, informing our discourse,
our theories, and our professional roles. Yet Lynch’s words remind us that this
construction takes place within rhetorical and institutional contexts that are not
without their own ideological function.
As noted in Sheryl Fontaine and Susan Hunter’s “Ethical Awareness: A
Process of Inquiry,” in moments when “context and situation has stimulated the
foregrounding of ethical awareness,” (6) our disciplinary scholarship has often
turned to critical self-examination. In particular, such introspection is evident
and necessary when “[t]he situations of a contemporary world—including academia and the classroom—can no longer be accounted for within the confines of
previously accepted ethical systems” (7). In this sense, the field’s recent scholarly
interest in ethics is necessary and timely: necessary given that vast changes in
technology, student populations, and writing research should cause us to revisit
the values and functions of the rhetorical tradition in the contemporary discipline; timely in that within our current cultural moment, notions of rhetorical
ethics are in flux, our perceptions of good citizenship increasingly fragmented.
Duffy’s work reminds us that reflection on disciplinary ethics provides a means
to intervene in these larger currents, a vehicle “through which we may tell the
story of our discipline and effectively intervene in the conduct of public argument” (“Ethical” 213). His efforts to revisit the role of ethics in disciplinary work
offer a starting point for intervention, a place to “begin a conversation; to open
a line of thinking; to invite a reconsideration of what we say we do, why we say
we do it, and why our work matters” (214).
This article attempts to take up Duffy’s challenge to reconsider “what we
say we do” by examining a limitation in the field’s vision of ethical pedagogy with
ethical implications of its own. Namely, discussions of the relationships between
ethics and writing instruction reveal a reliance on what ethicist Maria Merritt
defines as characterological measures of ethical behaviors: idealized expressions of
personal integrity or public morality we use to frame “ethical commitments that
anchor self-regulation primarily as ideals of personal character” (47). In developing models for ethics instruction in composition, much disciplinary scholarship
demonstrates an inclination to weigh ethical outcomes in characterological
terms, thereby perpetuating a framework described by Marguerite Helmers in
her work Writing Students: Composition Testimonials and Representations of Students,
where “[t]he writing comes to represent a person, a set of traits ascribed to an
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individual” (9). Helmers highlights this pattern in composition testimonials,
where perceived faults in student writing are often framed as deficiencies in
students’ moral codes, integrity, or principles. While composition research has
sought to illuminate the natural complexity of processes that contribute to the
mastery of academic discourse and conventions, thereby attempting to disassociate perceptions of error from perceptions of character, our frequent reference
to attitudinal and affective measures of learning can perpetuate this pattern. So,
for example, much has been said about the value of attributes like persistence
and grit in the practice of writing. Certainly these qualities can help students
succeed in school and in life: to learn from mistakes, to engage in productive
reflection, and to refine their writing through practice. But what of the students
who resist revision, who lack engagement, who continue to fail? When we focus
on such qualities of self-regulation as measures of success, it is difficult to avoid
assigning praise or blame based on assumptions about character aligned with
those qualities.
Reconsideration of this characterological orientation at the heart of ethical
pedagogy is of particular urgency because, despite disciplinary progress in recognizing the power of systemic and cultural influences on conceptions of the self,
social interaction, and written expression, the field’s ethical discourse remains
dependent on virtue-based models of ethics that fix our vision on elements of
a student’s character—on perceptions of the “goodness” of the self behind the
writing. This article demonstrates how this inclination is perpetuated through
our disciplinary vocabulary, pedagogy, and policy, restricting the ways in which
ethical rhetorical choices are examined and realized in our classrooms. Most
significantly, I argue, our emphasis on characterological approaches to teaching
the ethics of composing limits our capacity to help students consider rhetoric as
a tool for action guidance: as a means, to paraphrase James Porter’s Rhetorical
Ethics and Internetworked Writing, to help students determine not just who “one is
to be . . . [but] what one is to do” in particular discursive contexts (150, emphasis
added). Ethical theory and problems of moral philosophy can be instructive
in illuminating how characterological approaches to instruction can limit the
scope of students’ agency in rhetorical decision-making and consequentially
perpetuate patterns of exclusion that limit our capacity to “speak to the values
of connections, reciprocities, and interdependencies among peoples of diverse
and often conflicting ideologies” advocated in Duffy’s work (“Ethical” 217).
In place of characterological models for understanding and teaching ethics in
writing courses, I advocate for an expansion of our ethical vision in proposing
a dialogic model of ethical writing pedagogy—one that places multiple ethical
models (virtue-based, consequentialist, and deontological) in conversation—as
a means for focusing attention on action guidance in composing practice.
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Ethical Language in the Discipline: Writing, Virtue,
a n d A c t i o n G u i d a n c e i n C o m p o s i t i o n P ed a g o g y

Because Duffy’s articles are prominent and recent explorations of the intersection
of ethical and rhetorical theories in composition, they serve as an appropriate
starting point for understanding how the language we use for describing the role
of character, principled choices, and virtues plays out in writing pedagogy. Duffy
consistently foregrounds the centrality of language in articulating disciplinary
ideals and practices, calling for “an expanded ethical vocabulary” (“Ethical”
217) and “a language that will maintain our critical commitments but emphasize
equally an ethics of affinity, solidarity, and empathy” (218). Such calls for the
development of a more robust ethical language in the wake of both critical theory
and current public contexts—a language adequate for building alliances across
ideological differences, promoting reflective action in the face of oppression,
revealing structural inequities that limit ethical choice—are necessary, given the
struggle to articulate a more flexible ethical vision for composition studies now.
Duffy’s recent discussion of ethical frameworks in composition is grounded
in virtue ethics in that it links “discursive practices of virtue” (“Writer 235”) to
contemplation, thereby locating foundations for ethically informed pedagogy in
individual self-reflection. In “Aristotelian Virtue and the Interpersonal Aspect of
Ethical Character,” Merritt indicates that this orientation is a hallmark of virtue
ethics, which reflect: “A common, well-intentioned inflection of the first-person
perspective on ethical life” (46–7). Merritt goes on to distinguish virtue-oriented
philosophical models from other frameworks, stating,
Orthodox virtue ethics, unlike moral theories in the consequentialist or Kantian
families, grounds the criterion of right action in some conception of what an
idealized yet fully human agent would do. This builds into first-person ethical
practice, as fundamental and indispensable, a characterological orientation. (47)

Duffy’s work, which anchors his vision of ethical pedagogy in contemporary
virtue ethics, reflects this foundation. For example, Duffy draws from the work
of philosopher Rosalind Hursthouse in initially situating his ethical framework,
citing her definition of virtue as “the concept of something that makes its possessor
good” (13; emphasis added) to ground his contention that virtues are manifested
in personal dispositions (Duffy, “Ethical” 228).
Given such definitions and Merritt’s observations that virtue ethics is
contingent on “ideals of personal character” (47), what, exactly, does it mean
to build our pedagogy on characterological assessments of ethical behaviors?
Duffy’s most recent article, “The Good Writer: Virtue Ethics and the Teaching of Writing” advocates for the concept of virtue as a guideline for ethical
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rhetorical practice while deliberately attempting to sever its association with
character, as understood within the associated discourses of Christian traditions
and neo-Conservative politics (236–7). Specifically, he attempts to recast the
scope of virtue ethics in advocating for a return to virtue as a basis for pedagogical practice, noting,
Common to conceptions of contemporary virtue ethics is the idea that virtues are
the traits, attitudes, and dispositions of character that we associate with a good
person . . . we can observe that virtues are not thought by moral philosophers to
be innate, but developed through instruction, practice, and habit. (“Writer” 235)

Duffy thus sees the development of ethical practices as an outcome of writing
instruction rather than as an expression of innate attributes.
Despite these adjustments, Duffy’s framework for teaching ethical forms of
composing remains grounded in what philosophers would call an agent-focused
orientation. According to Eric Silverman, “All virtue theories are at least agentfocused. An ethical theory is agent-focused if there is an emphasis in it on the
moral importance of the virtuous individual and her character qualities over the
importance of the rightness or wrongness of particular actions” (507–8). Virtue
theorists, as characterized by Duffy, reject deontic (rules-based) or consequentialist forms of ethical action and instead turn to qualities of individual character
as a determinant in classifications of “right” actions (“Writer” 232–3). As such,
his model also seeks to build a vision of writing pedagogy based in not only the
embodiment of virtue, but also the practice of “the discursive practices of virtue”
(235; emphasis added). Rhetorical virtues thus serve as an ethical nexus connecting rhetorical reflection, disciplinary discourse, and ethical choice. According
to Duffy, “[I]t is in the language of the virtues, in what I will call ‘rhetorical
virtues’ . . . that students and teachers of writing can find ‘principles for action,’
or rationales for making ethical decisions in the writing class” (“Writer” 231).1
In this framework, the deliberation we enact through classroom practices—the
series of ethical choices about audience, sources, and claims that are the hallmark
of academic writing—is the very stuff of virtue. So, for example, when we speak
with students about proper attribution and citation as conveying a writer’s respect for the ideas of others—rather than as rigid, decontextualized rules to be
followed by students—we associate rhetorical gestures with characterological
values. Rhetorical deliberation is therefore transformed through ethical instruction, according to Duffy, since
when we discuss these choices with students, when we engage students in conversations about why they make some choices over others, we are in effect teaching
ethics; more accurately, we are exploring with our students what it means to be,
in an ethical sense, a “good writer.” (“Writer” 230)
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While Duffy acknowledges the slippery and at times troubling associations
between the language of virtue and the vocabulary of character development,
he finds promise in the practice of rhetorical virtue as “an alternative to ethical traditions grounded in rules and consequences, and offers, as well, a way of
thinking beyond the critical ethics of postmodernism” (231).
Drawing parallels between the demonstration of virtuous attributes and
the practice of rhetorical deliberation, however, is not sufficient to overcome
key problems of virtue-based ethical theories recognized by philosophers and
ethicists. Inherently, the prevailing logic supporting virtue-based rhetorical
frameworks hinges upon the demonstration of characterological traits we wish to
see reflected not just in their writing but in students themselves. Our disciplinary
language for talking about the actions of students in writing classrooms reflects
the limits of this logic, and central terms frequently used to observe and weigh
the aims of ethical development in composition—terms such as dispositions and
habits of mind—reinforce this tendency by framing “good writing” in terms of
students’ perceived individual attributes: for example, qualities such as “fairmindedness, tolerance, judgment, intellectual courage that speak to the character
of an individual” (Duffy, “Ethical” 219). As Duffy attests, the language of virtue
and the practice of rhetorical reflection, when paired, can provide a means for
instructors to position rhetorical actions within dynamic interpersonal contexts
rather than casting rhetorical choice as a reflexive response to a deontic system
of rules and regulations (e.g., those frequently invoked in current-traditional
models). Viewed through the lens of ethical theory, however, such links between virtue, reflection, and ethical action are not entirely clear. Fittingly, the
question of action guidance—of how one determines how to act in accordance
with ethical codes—is a matter of much interest in contemporary accounts of
ethical decision-making.
Psychological and philosophical approaches to virtue-based ethics commonly raise questions about whether links between traditional models of virtue
and ethical action can be readily or easily drawn. At the heart of such critiques
is an observation that virtue-based models define ethics in a circular fashion: as
the demonstration of “dispositions of character that we associate with a good
person” (“Writer” 235). Virtue-based models can therefore become problematic
in providing action guidance—in helping writers to identify the most “virtuous”
strategy or best rhetorical response, in this case—because they provide an insufficient framework for defining virtue (van Zyl 69). Even contemporary accounts
of virtuous action (like those found in Hursthouse’s On Virtue Ethics) begin to
unravel, according to such critiques, in defining
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right action in terms of the virtuous person, which in turn is specified in terms
of the virtues. The virtues are then defined as the character traits required for
eudaimonia. It is unclear, however, whether it is possible to explain eudaimonia in
a non-circular way, that is, without making reference to right action.2 (van Zyl 69)

This logical dilemma underscored in philosophical critiques of virtue ethics
has significant implications for the translation of ethical models into writing
pedagogy, as it raises questions about what our understanding of good writing
actually entails.
In determining how best to teach ethical frameworks for composition, according to virtue-based models, we need to begin by defining virtuous writing
practices, as they form a practical foundation for articulating how ethical ideals,
rhetorical decisions, and academic conventions interrelate. Duffy provides one
model for defining these relationships by citing Alisdair MacIntyre, who observes
in After Virtue that “goods internal to practices, including the goods internal
to the practice of making and sustaining forms of community” (188) illustrate
how virtues can be realized within practices. Still, MacIntyre continues, such
“internal” goods “need to be ordered and evaluated in some way” (188). Duffy
applies this conception of virtuous practice to writing pedagogy, where the good
can be determined through disciplinary practice: “following MacIntyre, we find
an answer to the question of whose virtues we should teach in the writing course:
our own” (“Writer” 239).
This adaptation, while useful in highlighting the role of ethical practice
in writing pedagogy, remains incomplete, according to Don Kraemer. In “The
Good, the Right, and the Decent: Ethical Dispositions, the Moral Viewpoint,
and Just Pedagogy,” Kraemer calls attention to this disciplinary tendency to
use circular reasoning in defining ethical practice in the field, noting that such
definitions often conflate the moral and the ethical. Considering a passage from
James Porter’s Rhetorical Ethics and Internetworked Writing, Kraemer notes, “[I]t
is exemplary of the conflation I see in comp studies to invoke ‘to the good’ and
then list ‘what is good’ as one of the items ‘to the good’ entails” (607).
If instruction bases students’ writing practice on a characterological model
produced by our particular traditions for defining “good” writing (and therefore
“good” writers), what does that mean for developing students’ sense of rhetorical
agency or self-efficacy as writers? For assessing students’ work fairly, effectively,
and ethically? These questions get to the heart of our own professional ethics,
revealing the challenge of building a pedagogy adequate for linking ethical
deliberation, ethical discourse, and rhetorical action. Duffy illustrates how this
problem has resonated in the discipline by revisiting Richard Lanham’s invocation of the “Q” Question in The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and

g110-132-Nov18-CE.indd 117

11/8/18 11:18 AM

118

College English

the Arts. Lanham’s challenge to English studies is to reflect on a fundamental
question underlying disciplinary practice: does humanistic education offered in
our classrooms actually produce more humane or virtuous individuals (155)?
Duffy echoes Lanham’s challenge in developing his argument for rhetorical
virtues, asking whether “good writing and speaking skills helps us, as Quintilian
assumed, become good people?” (“Ethical” 227). Duffy’s framework is a hopeful
response to this challenge. Yet, while few would disagree that cultivating reflection and emulation of virtuous behavior among writers is a valuable motivating
factor for work in composition, pedagogical models reliant on characterological
or virtue-based orientations arguably present only a partial response to such
fundamental questions.
Because virtue-based models are incomplete, our translation of ethical
theory into teaching practice requires us to balance two often-conflicting professional imperatives: namely, the desire to tell our own story about the links
between writing instruction and ethical action; and the moral imperative to
honor, respect, and engage students’ desire to write their own stories about ethics
and education. If, as Duffy indicates, our own virtues should serve as a basis for
ethical instruction, it would seem that our story, our traditional definition of
the good writer, wins out. On the other hand, an alternative model—one that
establishes a more comprehensive basis for determining what it means to write
ethically in context—might focus its efforts on practices that shape composing
not as a practice of virtue, but composing as a process of action guidance. In
other words, an alternative model could foreground composing as a means for
ethical decision-making—to situate writing practice in ways that encourage
students to not only emulate virtue, but to forge it when the good is contested,
in dispute, or seemingly out of reach.
Problems of Ethical Engagement: Characterological
O r i e n t a t i o n a n d S t u de n t R e p r e s e n t a t i o n

Duffy begins this project of shoring up links between thought and action by
highlighting the kairotic potential of rhetorical virtues, where “a virtue, then, is
the disposition to act in the right way, at the right time, and in the right manner”
(“Writer” 234). Because he defines rhetorical ethics as shaped by circumstance
and notions of appropriate action, they provide a first step in developing pedagogies that shift away from the deontic, static ethical models characteristic of
more traditional writing pedagogies. Additionally, if we agree that “[t]o write
is to make choices, and to teach writing is to teach rationales for making such
choices” (229), we can see that such scholarship on ethics in composition as that
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of Duffy is committed to creating pedagogical contexts in which action guidance
is an important goal.3
As noted previously, though, the problem inherent in characterological
models is that they too often reflect assumptions about how the “virtues” or “dispositions” required to make ethical decisions—rationales based on understanding
and modeling how good writers act—are reflected in student learning. We tend
to assume students will internalize processes for virtuous deliberation, identify
with them, and become better writers (and people) as a result. Yet, as Kristine
Hansen observes, “[I]f students enrolled in a college writing course, we might
cultivate more curiosity, openness, engagement, and creativity in them yet still
not improve their writing and reading a great deal” (541). Here, again, the questions posed by ethical theorists regarding virtue ethics and action guidance can
be instructive. According to Rosalind Hursthouse and Glen Pettigrove, ethicists
often raise challenges to virtue-based models based on the adequacy objection,
which states that “it is possible to perform a right action without being virtuous
and a virtuous person can occasionally perform the wrong action without that
calling her virtue into question.” In other words, virtuousness does not equate
with rightness. We can see elements of this objection recast in Kraemer’s response
to Duffy’s description of ethical dispositions as “those tendencies, habits, and
practices, such as fair-mindedness, tolerance, judgement, intellectual courage,
that speak to the character of the individual” which “are enacted in the course
of reading and composing texts” (Duffy, “Virtue” 219). Kraemer highlights the
ways in which virtue and ethical action may not necessarily coincide, particularly
in contexts where different values or expectations come into play, since “what is
ethical for any student to do may or may not solicit these [Duffy’s] dispositions”
(616). Additionally, though Duffy casts ethical dispositions as a reflection of “the
norms of the community or multiple communities in which the writer lives and
works” (“Virtue” 219), Kraemer observes that students and faculty may adhere
to value systems that are not reflected in the norms of this larger community
(616). In this way, Kraemer demonstrates how virtue-based representations of
decision-making are subject to the limitations raised by the adequacy objection
and complicated by student agency, experiences, and sense of community identity.
Disciplinary research into the nature of how writing works within communities helps us to understand that meaningful rhetorical action requires more
than a principled disposition and emulation of virtuous composing practices.
Instead, according to Ellen Barton, ethical choices are
interactional and therefore rhetorical. In other words, such decision-making
takes place between real people, in real time, in (semi-)ordinary language that
is typically more indirect than direct, within complex situations that are institu-
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tional and asymmetrical, and thus within a rhetorical context that always involves
persuasion and, sometimes, resistance. (599)

When considering ethical disciplinary practice, we must reflect on how our
pedagogies invite students to identify with/against discursive decision-making,
knowing that academic contexts are so frequently, as Barton notes, “complex . . .
and asymmetrical.” Our disciplinary project of building ethical models of composing is complicated by the asymmetrical nature of our enterprise. In particular,
as a range of scholarship in composition (see Helmers, Bloom, Grant, and Johnson, for example) illuminates, our language about students, their dispositions,
and their habits reflects our vision of their goodness, their appropriateness, or
their potential for success. Thus, while Barbara Grant’s “question of what kind
of people we want our students to become” (101) is of great importance to our
work as teachers, our norms too often reflect “a particular cultural construction
of studenthood which for some students is almost impossible to become” (102).
Ethical pedagogy—including models designed to foreground rhetorical
decision-making as a dynamic and discursive process—must be carefully constructed to honor student autonomy in attempting to meet collective aims. As
Dennis Lynch reminds us,
[O]nce we accept . . . that values not only inform what and how we teach but
also condition the very activities we hope to prepare our students to engage in,
then the question of autonomy—the concern for student autonomy—begins to
change its shape and significance. (367)

At a fundamental level, any attempts to recalibrate “the very activities we hope to
prepare” for our classrooms must, first and foremost, ask whether “the discursive
practices of virtue, the expression in speech and writing of honesty, accountability, generosity, and other qualities” are a reflection of “the traits, attitudes,
and dispositions” of the “good” student (Duffy, “Writer” 235), or merely one
who is obedient, reflecting the traits and habits of academic discourse that we
value and affirm in our definition of good writing.
By promoting a framework in which students’ dispositions and virtuous
attributes determine their goodness as writers and individuals, we risk reifying traditional power relations in the classroom. Our disciplinary tendency to
focus on characterological measures of ethical rhetorical practice amplifies this
effect. Such measures reinscribe the ethically problematic tendency observed
by Helmers in which “students are what they write” (9). Because associations
between student dispositions and virtue are shaped through a disciplinary lens
and embedded within the policies, pedagogies, and language we promote, our
practices can become ideologically loaded in ways that, while ethically trouble-
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some, become less evident to practitioners as we become more engrained in
disciplinary norms.
“Stacking

the

and the

Deck”: Disciplinary Habits of Mind
L i m i t s o f E t h i c a l P ed a g o g y

This ethical dilemma becomes more problematic when we consider that much
of the language we employ in describing ethical pedagogies tends to create a
reflection of students made in our own disciplinary image. Kraemer highlights
these problems in his discussion of Duffy’s vision of ethical composing practices
in “Ethical Dispositions: A Discourse for Rhetoric and Composition”:
These habits comprise what Duffy calls “transformative practice,” but the description of this practice seems unnecessarily unilateral: “We are teaching students
to expose themselves to the doubts and contradictions that adhere to difficult
questions and that call for reflection and self-examination. In teaching students
to listen to others, we are teaching the dispositions of tolerance, generosity, and
self-awareness.” As I’ve (de)contextualized these words (having yanked them away
from the question of what to tell the public we do), they stack the deck in our
favor and against our students: that is, we can teach students these transformative practices because we embody these practices, having been transformed by
them. (Kraemer 616)

While Kraemer notes that he “yanks” Duffy’s words from their full context,
he reveals a consequential undercurrent in our disciplinary ethos—one, which
Helmers and others have noted, tells a particular story about our work—our discipline transforms students into not just successful writers, but also good people.
An examination of disciplinary language for discussing ethical pedagogy
reinforces Duffy’s assertion that our vocabulary has not yet fostered an ethic
capable of “speak[ing] to the values of connections, reciprocities, and interdependencies among peoples of diverse and often conflicting ideologies” (“Ethical”
217) at the heart of contemporary writing policy. While Duffy attempts to build
this vocabulary using the language of the virtues, it is possible to see how virtuebased orientations continue to reflect “a discursive history of familiar storytelling
patterns that reiterate dominant professional concerns and locate practitioners
in a matrix of imperial control that has transcended composition’s paradigm
shifts” (Helmers 2). And what we’re attempting to control, in this disciplinary
story, is not just student writing, but students’ dispositions: the inclinations of
temperament, attitude, and deportment that shape student subjectivity.
Before we can begin to construct an ethical model for composing that is
driven by action guidance rather than character, we must begin to deconstruct
this disciplinary narrative that limits student control over their own ethical
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decision-making in composition. To do so, it is important to consider how the
field’s policy documents—those we use to set classroom standards and determine the activities of composing with which students will engage—contribute
to this discursive history. Let us take as an example the Framework for Success in
Postsecondary Writing, endorsed by the Council of Writing Program Administrators (CWPA), the National Council of Teachers of English (NCTE), and the
National Writing Project (NWP). Built around eight habits of mind, or “ways
of approaching learning that are both intellectual and practical,” the Framework
promotes characteristics associated with what Duffy might call “ethical dispositions,” including “openness,” “responsibility,” and “engagement” (CWPA 1). In
“Beyond Standards: Disciplinary and National Perspectives on Habits of Mind,”
Kristine Johnson writes, “[T]he Framework focuses attention on the civic and
ethical agency of student writers” (523). Specifically, the document’s framing
language attempts to bridge the theoretical gaps between ethical deliberation
and ethical action by associating these characteristics with a set of activities. The
Framework thus speaks to ethical concerns in representing the habits of mind less
as static or school-based attributes than as a set of ethical heuristics “cultivated
both inside and outside school” (CWPA 4) and used for inquiry, decision-making,
and negotiation. In building the Framework around deliberative practices that
foster reflective relationships between students and their audiences, the habits
of mind establish ethical foundations for writers and position writing as a way
of acting in/on the world.
Arguably, however, the foundational habits outlined in the document can,
translated into teaching practice, “stack the deck” in our favor by establishing a
portrait of the good student and shaping the trajectory of ethical action in the
composition classroom. As Johnson notes, “Habits of mind inherently focus
attention on the nature of the writer” (526). Further, she contends that
the Framework asks writing teachers to address the person behind writing products
and processes—to consider intellectual agency and the ethical aims of writing
instruction in an increasingly technocratic educational landscape. Teaching habits
of mind asks who writers should become and why they should become that way,
which in turn revives difficult, enduring questions associated with the rhetorical
tradition and the liberal arts: can virtue be taught, must a good speaker also be a
good man, should writing instruction presume to cultivate taste and civic virtue?
(527; emphasis in original)

Despite her questions, Johnson highlights that the document “does not position
these habits in a specific ethical or philosophical agenda” (527); yet is hard to
deny how a characterological inflection shapes the Framework, thereby informing the pedagogies and outcomes shaped by it.
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The implications of this orientation on pedagogical practice are clarified
by Judith Summerfield and Phillip Anderson in “A Framework Adrift,” a contribution to the 2012 College English symposium on the Framework document.
The article calls attention to the ways in which the Framework, in adapting
language from “The 16 Habits of Mind” by Costa and Kallick, shifts the focus
from habits as activities to habits as indicators of character or measures of good
student behavior:
[W]here Costa and Kallick use verbals or verbal phrases to describe the sixteen
habits (persisting, thinking flexibly, questioning and posing problems, and so on),
the Framework uses single nouns (persistence, flexibility, responsibility, and so on).
This nominalized list is static, even reified, leaving us with what appears to be a
set of personal values, states of being, or possibly innate character traits. In this
characterological, commonsense formula, student “failure” could be explained
away as personal failings of students: they are “lazy,” they are not “creative,” they
are not “curious,” or they are “not responsible for their own learning.” (545;
emphasis in original)

This passage is worth citing at length, as it illuminates the implications of ethical theory on teaching practice. Summerfield and Anderson, in their analysis,
recognize how a simple shift in the language of this policy document matters.
In this case, it can divert attention away from a dynamic model for ethical action guidance and instead emphasize more fixed, descriptive traits associated
with the assessment of character. Such critiques of the Framework’s language
demonstrate how disciplinary vocabulary has been used in ways that deflect our
vision from what, exactly, we measure when we measure habits of mind: the
sanctioned behaviors or characters of our students.4
Further, as a document positioned to establish aims for writing instruction
across grade levels, the document’s equation of habits of mind and student success is both logically troublesome and ethically vexing, limiting its capacity to
speak to practices that position rhetorical ethics as a form of action guidance.
The introduction to the document measures successful writers in terms of college readiness and career preparation, stating, “Students who come to college
writing with these habits of mind and these experiences will be well positioned
to meet the writing challenges in the full spectrum of academic courses and later
in their careers” (CWPA 2). The logic implied is that being ready for collegelevel courses involves displaying the habits of mind deemed virtuous for writers
and undertaking experiences required to enroll in such courses, reflecting an
educational environment that is self-perpetuating and circular, where “all it takes
to be ‘successful’ is to have the ‘right’ habits” (Summerfield and Anderson 545).
This logic reduces the meaning of what it is for students to be “well positioned”
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to meet challenges across courses and in their careers and does little to guide
students toward greater intellectual or ethical autonomy.
Most troublesome, this framing of habits of mind as a mechanism of success
works against students’ capacity to act as mindful ethical agents, contributing to
a larger pattern observed by Grant, who argues
The culture of autonomy and individualism at the university constructs students
who believe that success or failure lies with them. Thus, solely responsible for
their academic success, they seek to take care of themselves, and in this way the
institution takes care of itself. (110)

If we hope to engage students in writing informed by careful ethical deliberation—as a tool for action guidance—documents like the Framework place limits
on our capacity to translate policy into more critical, other-oriented approaches
to understanding writing. As critical responses to the Framework attest, despite
our commitment to pedagogical ethics, many of the norms we valorize as a field
remain inherently connected to the business of educational consumerism and
the entrenchment of middle-class models of success, therefore providing little
disciplinary space in which students’ ethical autonomy can take shape.
Ethics as Heuristic: Generating Social
a n d S t r u c t u r a l F r a m ew o r k s f o r A c t i o n

There is, however, hope that efforts to redirect the field’s ethical vocabulary
toward ethical pedagogies—those responsive to social conditions and respectful
of cultural and material contexts—is bearing fruit. In Duffy’s terms, this effort is
an extension of our evolving sense of what it means to write ethically: to engage
in composition as an activity “committed to the health of the reader-writer connection” (“Writer” 241). By teaching in ways that recognize how ethical norms,
virtues, and actions are situated in local rhetorical contexts, and by working to
honor the diversity of perspectives that shape students’ and teachers’ understanding of ethical behaviors, we begin to build new kinds of ethical commitments
that extend beyond a sense of individual virtue or a static set of values.
Despite this progress, however, the ethics of individual character are hard to
shake, remaining dominant in discourse about the ethics of composing. So, for
example, though Duffy’s work defines ethical pedagogy as a means to facilitate
productive reader-writer relationships, the questions he encourages in practice
are self-directed, not other-directed: “What kind of person do I want to be?
How should I live my life? What does it mean to be a good person?” (“Writer”
230, emphasis added). The problem with this stance for instructional practice is
that it retains a focus on the individual student as the center of ethical scrutiny
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in the classroom, emphasizing responsibility on students for “taking care of
themselves” as writers. Additionally, it places the instructor in the position of
measuring the degree of responsibility students demonstrate in being a good
person, as indicated through the character of their language or the virtuousness
of their writing habits.
While Duffy’s stance in advocating virtue ethics as a basis for such action is
grounded in the knowledge that “[a] framework for rhetorical ethics . . . should
account for more than outcomes” (“Writer” 241), pedagogical frameworks based
on virtue cannot stand alone in guiding ethical rhetorical action. Because virtues
themselves are enmeshed in a network of cultural assumptions, discursive values, conventional expectations, and material consequences, ethical frameworks
for composition must provide a means by which students can engage actively
in rhetorical decision-making. Therefore, what is needed is an ethic that shifts
away from virtue as a basis for observation, evaluation, and enactment in the
classroom: an ethic built, in philosopher Elizabeth Foreman’s terms, “not in
terms of virtuous engagement, but appropriate engagement, which means deemphasizing traits and virtuous activities, and emphasizing ways of seeing others”
(952n13; emphasis in original). We need what James Kinneavy, in “Ethics and
Rhetoric: Forging a Moral Language for the English Classroom,” calls “a need
for a social, rather than an individual, ethic and the language to talk about it” (1).
To work toward this end, we need not just a social ethic, but a dialogical
one: an ethic that calls upon instructors to facilitate conversations with and
among students about how rhetorical actions not only reflect the character
of the writer, but also the discursive negotiation of differing ethical systems.
Within this framework, I propose, we can shape a definition of composing on
measured action guidance: foregrounding writing as an activity that involves
critical navigation of multiple and competing ethical standards (deontological,
consequentialist, and virtue-based, if not others). By putting these systems in
dialogue, this model redefines the ethical work of composing while actively foregrounding the complexity of ethics that often underlie conventions for thinking,
arguing, and acting in both academic and public life. This negotiation would
require students to position themselves as rhetorical agents operating within
communities whose boundaries are demarcated by various conventions for ethical
action. In this way, our disciplinary role as writing instructors becomes one of
support for students as they come to understand and position themselves within
the systems that constitute “the very activities we hope to prepare our students
to engage in” (Lynch 367).
To enact this model, classroom conversation and activities should be designed to create conceptual bridges connecting thought, language, and action
by using the three primary ethical frameworks as heuristics: ways of guiding
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students through rhetorical options in light of overlapping systems of value. Paul
Connolly, in “The Poet(h)ical Art of Teaching,” offers a valuable heuristic for
developing pedagogies appropriate for a dialogic model, asking, “What can we
learn together that we cannot learn alone?” (21). Instead of positioning individual
traits at the center of a framework for rhetorical action in writing classrooms,
Connolly positions deliberative talk and collaborative reflection as activities
that reposition the traditional role of students and teachers in determining and
assessing classroom ethics, observing that
the authority of teachers comes from our ability to negotiate boundary conversations between those outside a community of discourse and those who seek admission to it. A teacher is a translator, reconciling the natural language and native
concepts that students bring into the classroom with the acquired language and
concepts that various “communities of discourse” have evolved to articulate their
interpretations of life . . . a teacher’s task is to mediate the work of students, not
determine what must be done. (23; emphasis in original)

Connolly’s metaphor of the teacher as a translator for students who natu-rally
speak a (single) language whose influence ends at the classroom door is not well
aligned with the field’s current understandings of teachers, students, and the
discursive practices of authority in academic communities. Still, his vision of
the ethical classroom provides a foundation for seeing beyond virtue-based
or characterological measures of the good writer. In shifting the act of ethical
deliberation from the question, “How should I live my life?” to the question
of how “‘communities of discourse’ . . . articulate their interpretations of life”
(and particularly the “good” life), Connolly demonstrates how we can frame
writing instruction in ways that equip students to understand rhetorical ethics
as dynamic, social, and mutable—the product of overlapping systems of value,
not just stable notions of virtue.
Instead of positioning the instructor as a translator or lead negotiator in a
clash between student values and academic virtues, a dialogic model of ethics
allows instructors to create a structure in which consideration of various ethical
obligations gives shape to students’ rhetorical choices in context. Specifically,
the proposed model would ask students to engage the three primary ethical
frameworks as rhetorical heuristics: as ways of guiding writing practice through
shifting and overlapping systems of value that determine what good writing
entails in various contexts. By creating classroom environments that foreground
composing as an act of negotiation among the rhetorical constraints embedded
in particular ethical choices, we invite students to engage in the process of rhetorical action guidance. Such an approach would help us achieve three primary
disciplinary aims:
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First, it would help writing teachers to demonstrate the ways in which ethics (especially those attributes Duffy classifies as rhetorical virtues) are systemic,
linguistic, and enacted not only by individuals, but also institutions. This provides
a means for interrogating the ideology and formation of academic conventions,
as well as the traditional role of ethical education in rhetorical instruction.
Second, placing multiple systems for determining ethical value in dialogue
would model how rhetorical deliberation is guided situationally and simultaneously by notions of character (virtue-based ethics), correctness (deontological
ethics), and desired results (consequentialist ethics). In this way, we might begin
to address the adequacy objection, since the activities of the writing classroom can
be made to engage writers in rhetorical decision-making with equal attention to
both deliberation (choosing among the ethical paths enacted through different
rhetorical choices) and execution (creating written work that consciously enacts
the community values for which it is produced).
Third, it provides a means for students to better understand, reveal, resist,
or revise traditional assumptions about the good student, the good writer, or
the good person by highlighting the very real ethical conflicts that inform their
positions as academic subjects and ethical actors. According to Kraemer:
We belong to multiple communities, communities whose values (even if sometimes overlapping) can conflict. Sometimes such conflict may settle itself, yet at
other times it may unsettle us: that question, that is, of which has priority, which
of our communities or which particular community value. Such moments concern
conflicts of ethical perspectives—conflicts that constitute conflicts that are moral.
Moral conflicts are how we reason about (ethical) values . . . That we can reason
about something as seemingly personal and private as values is important to our
disciplinary enterprise. (605–6; emphasis in original)

Kraemer casts this deliberative relationship between community values and
individual values as the product of a productive tension between ethical and
moral imperatives. This tension can serve as a foundation for instruction that
helps students to understand writing as more than a set of conventions, but as
a tool for decision-making. In this way, ethical tensions can also be brought to
bear on the very language of the writing classroom in references to competing
obligations we’re called to consider when we write: not just considerations like
“What kind of [writer] do I wish to be?” (Duffy, “Writer” 230) or “What effects
will my words have upon my community?” (Kraemer 615), but also, What are
the differences between my goals as a writer and the expectations of my community? and What are the consequences of appealing to my value of x, when
my audience valorizes appeals that y?
How might such an ethical framework operate, in terms of pedagogy?
One valuable starting point is to work from the discipline itself: specifically, the
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ways in which our discipline positions ethics or ethical dispositions in defining
“the traditions, narratives, and histories that express our collective knowledge
about what it [is] to be a good writer, making good choices” (Duffy, “Writer”
239). To do so, we might ask students to look at documents like the Framework,
asking them to consider how the habits of mind draw a picture of the good or
ethical writer. What can writers do—in terms of their choices—to demonstrate
“responsibility” or “flexibility” in their writing? How are such attributes—and
their associated experiences—shaped consciously or unconsciously by rules,
by consequences, and by representations of the good student? And why might
these be valued differently by teachers, students, or other audiences? In asking
students to consider: 1). why these terms, values, and activities may have been
selected; and 2). how these values and activities are enacted, in their experience,
through English education, we invite students to begin the work of articulating
their connection to ethical rhetorical practice and to understand their position
as subjects in the field. Once students have identified the ethical language inherent in documents like the Framework or other disciplinary documents (e.g.,
the WPA Outcomes Statement, the “Students’ Right to Their Own Language”
position statement), they can begin the work of reflection and revision, writing
about the activities that define their orientation to responsibility or flexibility as
writers. Such documents can help students to more overtly and self-consciously
negotiate differences in values about writing that they’ve grappled with. They
can also help a class negotiate sets of ground rules for ethical writing behaviors
and expectations, inviting alternative frameworks or terms for understanding
the good or ethical writer.
A primary criticism of virtue-based rhetorical ethics deals with the logical
gap between the activities of the writing classroom and the logical end of character
development. Confronting disciplinary norms regarding ethical values provides
a way of bridging the gap. Duffy also attempts to address this gap by equating
common rhetorical conventions with specific virtues. So, for example, he states,
“If we define arguments as the teaching of claims, proofs, and counterarguments,
we are necessarily and inevitably engaged, as I have written previously (‘Virtuous’), in practices of ethical deliberation” (“Writer” 238). Duffy continues,
“When we teach students how to make claims, then, we are inviting them to
practice the rhetorical virtues of honesty and mutual respect” (238). Yet it is
worth repeating that the action does not necessarily ensure the ethic. Teaching
students to make claims does not always foster understanding of how particular
claims come to be valued in particular communities. Further, viewed through
different ethical lenses, not all claims are equal: they compete; they overlap; they
change over time. Understanding claims as more than conventions, as Kraemer
reminds us, requires writers to grapple with moral choices and “reason about
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(ethical) values” (605). So we must engage students in dialogue and activities
that can assist them in considering how rules, consequences, and habits shape
their own claims, as well as the ethical grounds shaping the authority to make
them. In doing so, they begin forming an ethical language required to speak to
their rhetorical choices and actions across disciplines and contexts. If we agree,
with Porter, that “‘[e]thics is not a set of answers but a mode of questioning and
a manner of positioning’” (qtd. in Duffy, “Writer” 243), we must help students
to not only understand the nature of the questioning, but also the language
necessary to positioning themselves within the complex of ethical tensions that
defines writing activities in context.
This matter of positioning is of great importance to Duffy, Connolly, and
others who work in pursuit of more ethical classrooms. For example, according
to Duffy, we can use reading as an ethical tool for helping students position
themselves in ethical discourse. By providing exemplars of activist writing, Duffy
demonstrates, we can model how rhetorical virtues are represented or renewed
through language. In this model, instructors can provide examples of texts and
facilitate conversations to help students “see how they embody rhetorical virtues,
whether candor, courage, empathy, or others” (“Writer” 246). When students
have the opportunity to examine the ways in which texts can demonstrate ethical choices, they can become more informed ethical actors, writers equipped to
“provide their own exemplars and . . . collaborate on defining the ethical writer
for themselves” (246).
Yet, let us consider how this type of activity models the ethical work involved
in action guidance or rhetorical choice. While Duffy advocates for the use of
texts to demonstrate how, for example, resistant arguments operate ethically and
rhetorically, the assumptions about how to position students for ethical action
remain grounded in modeling virtue as displayed by good writers. The virtue
is “embodied” in the text: a fairly static model for formulating behaviors about
how good people act (or write, in this case). There is value in using exemplars
to engage students in acts of critical reading that precede or recur in the writing
process, but such instruction-through-exemplars is just a first step in facilitating
the experience of “open-ended practical struggle” (Connolly 17) that makes
ethics an activity of questioning and positioning—a guide for rhetorical action.
How, then, might Duffy’s model be supplemented by a dialogic ethical
vision? The key is inherent in Connolly’s invocation of the question, What can
we learn together that we cannot learn alone?—and, I would add, a second set
of questions: How do various ethics operate together to shape texts in ways not
explained by virtue alone? How do texts demonstrate not just a vision of rhetorical
virtue, but also a glimpse of a larger context involving tensions between adherence/resistance to rules and acknowledgment/manipulation of consequences?
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To establish classroom models that invite students to engage such questions, we might begin by asking groups of students to read a text rhetorically,
considering a particular ethical stance (deontological, consequential, or virtuebased). Then, we could put those groups in dialogue about which decisions
speak to those various ethical orientations. Which decisions contribute to/resist
notions of good writing, and how do the features of the text reflect different
ends (consequences), expectations (rules), and ideals (virtues)? Students might
then consider the weight and wisdom of such choices. Or, to extend an exercise
from Duffy’s work (“Writer” 245), we might ask students to consider tensions
in texts like “A Latina Judge’s Voice,” juxtaposing the ways in which Justice
Sonia Sotomayor’s speech models adherence to the rules for good citizenship
but also challenges the definitions of what good citizenship entails. What are the
consequences of that tension in determining what is “good” about Sotomayor’s
account of citizenship? How do her choices challenge (or reinscribe) notions
of virtuous action we normally associate with American citizenship? We could
then invite students to rewrite the definitions of ethical action or good citizenship grounding the speech in light of more recent circumstances: in light of
the backlash against immigration; in light of “America first” rhetoric; in light
of criticisms of Sotomayor herself. How might the choices represented in the
text have different consequences or require different rhetorical rules, given the
change in context? What virtues need greater emphasis/de-emphasis in light of
such changes in cultural tone?
Considering the range of ethical frames negotiated in rhetorical deliberation
provides students with options for developing critical strategies in referencing
and potentially resolving diverse ethical imperatives through rhetorical action.
It also allows students collaborative practice, through conversation with peers
and a facilitator/instructor, to construct and reconstruct ethical representations
of “the good” in dialogue, engaging in the practices necessary to “finding affinities, acknowledging interdependencies,” and recognizing the contingency
and complexity of ethical decision-making in language (Duffy, “Writer” 244).
Introducing a dialogic, deliberative model of ethics shifts the classroom’s
ethical focus away from characterological virtue, potentially helping students
to better understand the complexity tied up in ethical action (and in rhetorical decision-making). Ultimately, this shift represents one step toward an aim
clarified by Connolly:
In thinking about the ethics of relations that occur in a classroom, emphasis often
falls on . . . the ethical responsibility of the teacher or on the ethical power of
texts, as agents of change. Equally important to notice, however, in the varied and
complex subject-object relations of a classroom, is what enhances the responsibility
and potency of students. What internal disciplines do students acquire as they
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interact with teachers, texts, and other students? What ecology of the classroom
nurtures “the good” of each of its members? (14–15)

The key to our ethical aims as a discipline is not ultimately to recreate students
in our own image by reaffirming instructors’ role as arbiters of rhetorical virtues. Yet the language we have developed in order to discuss the ethics of our
enterprise—particularly language that valorizes our role in shaping students’
ethical dispositions and habits of mind—places the utmost responsibility for
embodying our collective virtues on the student. As a discipline, we must continue to shape a new ethical vision that acknowledges our responsibilities and
our students’ responsibilities for rhetorical deliberation by asking Connolly’s
question of ourselves: What can we learn together—with students, about ethical
action—that we have not yet learned alone?
Notes
1. Duffy credits John Gage and Norbert Elliot for developing this terminology (“Writer”
246n4).
2. Duffy defines eudaimonia in both its classical Aristotelian sense of “‘happiness,’ ‘well-being,’ or
‘flourishing.’” as well as in Hursthouse’s sense of “the sort of happiness worth having.” He ultimately
defines eudaimonia as “the activity of living well throughout the course of a lifetime” (“Writer” 233).
3. For more extensive accounts of ethical approaches to writing instruction, see also Fontaine
and Hunter’s collection Foregrounding Ethical Awareness in Composition, Porter’s Rhetorical Ethics and
Internetworked Writing, and Gale, Sipiora, and Kinneavy’s Ethical Issues in College Writing.
4. For additional critiques of the Framework’s focus on habits of mind and other attitudinal
qualities, see Gross and Alexander’s “Frameworks for Failure” and Kristine Hansen’s “The Framework
for Success in Postsecondary Writing: Better Than the Competition, Still Not All We Need."
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